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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Student loan debt has received plenty of attention over the past several years from the media, scholars 
and policymakers. Increased scrutiny on aggregate and individual debt, especially for graduate and 
professional students, has led some to question the efficacy and value of some federal loans, arguing 
the private sector is better equipped to handle providing access to advanced education.
But the value of federal loans is unmistakably clear: they provide access to education to those who 
would otherwise not be able to afford it. This goal of expanding access to advanced education, which 
is of no import to private lenders, is critical to maintaining America’s high educational and economic 
standing. Having formerly been one of the largest private student loan lenders in the country, and given 
our focus on graduate and professional education, we show in this report that the private sector would 
be an inadequate substitute for the current federal investment in higher education, especially regarding 
maintaining access to advanced education for all students. 
As Congress deliberates the value of advanced education through reauthorization of the Higher 
Education Act, it is critical that it is armed with complete and accurate context, data and potential 
effects of proposed policy changes. Proposals designed to have the federal government retreat from 
providing loans to those seeking graduate and professional degrees are misguided at best, and if 
implemented, would substantially hinder access to advanced education for those who need it most.
This report, the second of our two-part series on graduate lending, uses federal data to show, as one 
example, that black borrowers and Historically Black Colleges and Universities would likely be severely 
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harmed by a move to significantly limit or outright eliminate federal lending to graduate and professional 
students.
Key takeaways:
• Changes to programs that would negatively impact and target graduate and professional students 
(e.g., further limiting or eliminating Grad PLUS, increasing repayment amounts or time to forgiveness, 
etc.) would be ill-advised because these students are, by far, the best performing cohort of borrowers 
in the federal student loan portfolio.
• Private student loan lending is an inadequate substitute for the access-driven investment from the 
federal government in advanced education. Differing incentives, goals and underwriting means the 
private sector would be unwilling to risk sacrificing profits to provide access for many students; thus, it 
could not properly serve the diverse and broad demands of the American workforce.
• Black borrowers and Historically Black Colleges and Universities would likely be the most substantially 
harmed by privatization of graduate lending because of the difficulty many students would have 
obtaining privately financed credit under traditional underwriting standards.
• Addressing institutional quality and accountability cannot be intermingled with changes to federal 
loans. Severely limiting or eliminating federal graduate lending should not be used as an end-run 
around difficult-to-construct accountability systems because doing so would unnecessarily punish 
students.
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PROVIDING ACCESS IS PARAMOUNT
Expanding access to all students, no matter their background, is the fundamental foundation of the 
federal investment in higher education. Without this investment, we would live in a country where 
only the privileged few would have access to the full range of educational opportunities available. 
This would unnecessarily limit the expansion of the country’s intellectual capital, and it would 
diminish the direct and compounding benefits less privileged students provide to the American 
public. America is best served when everyone is given the chance to contribute to its advancement.
Congress, since it passed the Higher Education Act (HEA) in 1965, has committed to creating 
financing programs for postsecondary students that are squarely focused on increasing access to 
allow for a more educated American populace.1 The chief student-centered lever to expand access 
is providing financial aid to students pursuing postsecondary education. At the graduate level, this is 
achieved primarily through the Direct Unsubsidized Loan and the Direct PLUS (Grad PLUS) Loan.2 
Federal funding of graduate study allows students, many of whom would otherwise be unable to 
do so, to access advanced education, which more middle-class jobs now require.3 And while there 
are certainly ways in which the federal loan programs could be improved, proposals that expect 
the private sector to fill the financing void left by capping or eliminating federal loans to graduate 
students must be weighed against the fundamental purpose of HEA: expanding access.
Failure to reform graduate lending without ensuring that access is maintained would result in 
significant unintended consequences. Changes that neither align with program goals nor sufficiently 
account for implementation effects will create problems that are more detrimental than the purported 
problems the proffered changes were intended to cure. To mitigate such risks, policymakers must 
keep proper perspective and consider relevant data when discussing policy changes to federal 
graduate lending. This paper, the second of two, provides important context regarding private 
student loan lending and illuminates the almost certain negative consequences of limiting federal 
lending for graduate study.
1
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REPORT ROADMAP
This report supplements our previous analysis showing the principal criticisms of the Grad PLUS 
loan—the impact of the loan’s terms and its potential cost—are unsupported by data or likely 
exaggerated.4 As policymakers continue to target graduate borrowers, we hope to highlight the 
critical function that the federal role in graduate lending plays in ensuring access to advanced 
education and how proposals to curtail or eliminate it have failed so far to fully explore the potential 
severely negative consequences for students, institutions and America writ large.
This report seeks to provide necessary context around private graduate student lending and 
explain how significantly paring back or ceasing graduate federal lending programs will likely 
disproportionally prevent historically underrepresented populations from accessing advanced 
education. To demonstrate the likely impact, we focus on federal lending data for black graduate 
borrowers. The report also aims to move the discussion about graduate borrowing beyond the current 
rhetoric so that policymakers and stakeholders have an accurate picture of the policy implications of 
retreating from the federal investment in graduate education.
We begin by briefly discussing how the goal of private student lending is fundamentally different 
from the government’s mission. We then explain how a return to the pre-Grad PLUS era is not 
feasible. Following that, we illustrate how various underwriting criteria are or could be used in 
private student lending to determine loan eligibility. Finally, using these underwriting criteria, we 
focus on how minority students, specifically black graduate borrowers, would be unlikely to obtain 
private student loans, thereby creating a significant access issue for them and the institutions they 
attend.
We neither seek to shield federal lending programs or graduate borrowing from criticism nor 
suggest there are no potential issues on the horizon.5 Rather, we aim to shed light on the negative 
consequences that would result from reducing the lending cap or eliminating federal graduate loans 
altogether, specifically hindering access to graduate education, especially among black students. 
The information presented here should help lawmakers evaluate current proposals around graduate 
lending, and it can be used as a guide for potential reforms during reauthorization of HEA.
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A NOTE ABOUT ACCESSLEX INSTITUTE
As a nonprofit organization comprised of nearly 200 American Bar Association-approved nonprofit 
and state-affiliated law schools, AccessLex Institute has been committed to improving access to and 
maximizing the affordability and value of a law degree, and graduate and professional education 
more broadly, since 1983.
For nearly 30 years, we provided and serviced private and federally backed student loans, with 
an emphasis on lending to students engaged in graduate programs of study. After a change in 
federal law in 2010, we ceased offering any new student loans, but we have continued our mission 
to improve access, affordability and value through various initiatives including financial education, 
research and grant-making.
At our lending peak, known at the time as Access Group®, we were the seventh largest private 
student loan lender – and the largest nonprofit student loan provider – in the country. The vast 
knowledge and experience we gained in this field allow us to speak authoritatively about private 
lending. Although potential lending decisions and underwriting criteria are different for each 
financial institution, what we discuss below is based on decades of experience and a normalized set 
of industry lending standards that suggests our analysis would fairly predict the outcome of a change 
in graduate federal lending policies.
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GRADUATE BORROWING PARADOX
Over the past several years, much has been made about the cost of higher education and the 
increase in student borrowing. The headline grabbing $1.6 trillion in outstanding student loans has 
moved higher education debt from the policy world into mainstream consciousness.6 As a result, 
politicians have introduced or championed policies like debt-free college, income share agreements 
and institutional risk-sharing to constrain rising debt levels.
While many agree that some sort of policy prescription should be offered to address student debt, 
there is no consensus that the amount of outstanding student debt is even a problem.7 For those who 
do believe it to be troublesome, there are many theories as to who or what may be driving increases 
in student debt. However, some policymakers and academics believe they have identified the culprit 
of higher education financing issues: graduate students.
This is a perplexing contention for several reasons. Among the myriad federal higher education 
programs, very few are targeted specifically at graduate students, and those that exist are almost 
always less fiscally beneficial to students than the undergraduate offerings. For example, the 
federal loan exclusively for graduate students, Grad PLUS, has less favorable terms than federal 
undergraduate loans. Specifically, graduate borrowers pay a higher interest rate on their loans, often 
accounting for thousands of more dollars paid over the life of the loan than a borrower with only 
undergraduate debt.8 Grad PLUS borrowers also have significantly higher federal loan origination 
fees.9
Moreover, graduate borrowers are no longer eligible for Direct Subsidized Loans, meaning almost 
all their federal graduate loans accrue interest while they are enrolled in school. Yet again, graduate 
borrowers pay thousands more over the life of their federal loans, especially those enrolled in 
longer programs like research doctoral or medical programs.10 Additionally, the terms of the most 
recent income-driven repayment plan require graduate borrowers make qualifying payments for an 
additional five years, compared to those with solely undergraduate debt, before they can receive 
loan forgiveness.11
Despite all this, graduate borrowers are the best performing cohort in the federal student loan 
portfolio.12 Even with higher average loan balances, higher interest rates, and higher fees than 
undergraduates, graduate borrowers have the highest repayment rates and the lowest default rates 
by a significant margin (Figure 1 and Table 1).13,14 Moreover, as of the first quarter of 2019, the total 
outstanding loan volume of exclusively graduate debt, Grad PLUS, is $71.3 billion or just under 5 
percent of the entire federal loan portfolio.15 These facts make it clear that graduate borrowers are 
a critical asset to the federal government’s loan portfolio. While shouldering the most debt, having 
the least favorable loan terms and repaying the most over time, graduate borrowers have been, are, 
and remain the highest-performing group in the portfolio, especially relative to their undergraduate 
and non-completing peers. It would be particularly misguided to target this group of borrowers for 
additional programmatic cuts.
2
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Note: Borrowers enter repayment in the stated year. Graduate-only borrowers are those who borrow only to attend 
graduate school. Default rates are based on defaults occurring within five calendar years from the date of entering 
repayment. Definition of selectivity taken from Barron’s Educational Series.16 
Source: Authors’ modification of Trends in Student Aid 2018, Figure 2016_11B.
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Nevertheless, the acute focus on graduate borrowing has led to calls and proposals to eliminate 
the Grad PLUS loan or severely limit federal lending to graduate students.17 Some even suggest 
removing the federal government entirely from the graduate lending marketplace.18 But how would 
the hundreds of thousands of graduate students finance their graduate education in the absence of 
federal support? The solution, some critics proffer, is to let the private sector take over completely.19
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MEDIAN FEDERAL DEBT BALANCE AND FIVE-YEAR 
DEFAULT RATE BY INSTITUTION TYPE (AY 2008-09)
 Table 1
MEDIAN DEBT DEFAULT RATE
PUBLIC TWO-YEAR $7,830 38%
FOR-PROFIT $8,450 47%
NONSELECTIVE FOUR-YEAR $14,650 27%
SELECTIVE FOUR-YEAR $17,770 18%
MOST SELECTIVE FOUR-YEAR $18,870 10%
GRADUATE-ONLY BORROWERS $37,660 5%
Note: Dollars in 2013 dollars, adjusted for inflation. Graduate-only borrowers are those who borrow only to attend 
graduate school. Default rates are based on defaults occurring within five calendar years from the date of entering 
repayment.
Source: Authors’ reproduction of Trends in Student Aid 2018, Figure 2016_11B.
Suggesting that private student loans are an adequate replacement for federal student loans, 
especially for graduate borrowers, seems to be premised on two main arguments.20 First, there was a 
time before Grad PLUS when private loans played a role in funding graduate education, so we can 
simply transition back to that time. Second, the private sector has competition and lending discipline, 
and thus, the theory goes, privatization will result in some sort of market-based pressures being 
applied on institutions to either improve outcomes or lower prices.
Unfortunately, advocates for privatizing all graduate student lending do not adequately wrestle with 
how this policy might work in the present day. More specifically, proponents of a private student 
lending takeover do not address the effects, especially unintentional ones, wholesale privatization of 
graduate loans would have on institutions and certain populations.
Black graduate borrowers would likely be 
disproportionally harmed by privatizing graduate 
lending. Implementing that policy change would 
create a massive access issue for blacks who seek to 
advance their careers though graduate education.
12
For example, our analysis shows that black graduate borrowers would likely be disproportionally 
harmed by privatizing graduate lending. Implementing that policy change would create a massive 
access issue for blacks who seek to advance their careers though graduate education, thereby 
exacerbating the already dismal diversity rates in professions preferring or requiring advanced 
degrees.
This type of problem is exactly what the Higher Education Act was designed to prevent. Potential 
access issues illustrate why it is critical for the federal investment in graduate education to remain 
and why the private sector would be an inadequate substitute to try to level the playing field for 
access to advanced education. The current federal lending programs seek to create equity in higher 
education while staying true to HEA’s fundamental purpose of expanding access.
13
3DENIED!
PRIVATE MARKET AND LENDING DECISIONS
Policymakers seeking to eliminate federal lending to graduate students must ensure their assumptions 
and arguments are sound and well-grounded. Before enacting a substantial change, those 
advocating for a private lender takeover must understand the current market, how lending decisions 
are made and how a change like this would impact access. 
Below we briefly explore what makes today’s market unique, why the federal government and 
private sector’s motivations are irreconcilably different and how lending decisions are or could be 
made. All of these would materially affect lending decisions, and as a result, the makeup of graduate 
school enrollment and the American economy.
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THEN VS. NOW (PRE- AND POST-GRAD PLUS)
The principal argument for eliminating federal investment in graduate education is that since private 
lending previously played a dominant role, at least for a relatively short period, in how students 
financed their graduate education, we can simply go back to that system without ill effects. But the 
world has changed since that time. Turning to private lending as the primary way for graduate students 
to pay for school is no longer a viable option because of the combination of increased education 
costs and a tighter credit market. The combination of these factors means there is no “going back.” The 
elimination of federal graduate lending would place advanced education funding in territory not seen 
in several decades, when graduate school populations were wealthier and less diverse.
While private lending may have comprised an increasing portion of student financing leading up to 
the introduction of Grad PLUS, historical lending data shows that private lending never enjoyed a 
commanding share of the market (Figure 2).21 Even at its peak between 2006 and 2008, non-federal 
loans accounted for only a quarter of student financing.22 More importantly, of that quarter, historical 
lending analysis suggests that the overwhelming majority of private lending was for undergraduates, 
and that the graduate lending that did occur accounted for a mere 9 to 12 percent.23
15
Note: Dollars in 2017 dollars, adjusted for inflation. Non-federal loans include loans to students from states and 
institutions in addition to private loans issued by banks, credit unions and other lenders. Values for non-federal loans 
are best estimates and are less precise than federal loan amounts.
Source: Authors’ modification of Trends in Student Aid 2018, Figure 6.
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Examining graduate private lending specifically, in 2007-08 just 11 percent of graduate education 
costs were financed by private loans (Figure 3).24 By academic year 2015-16, that number had 
dropped to just 5 percent.25 In the same academic year, roughly 90 percent of graduate lending 
was provided by the federal government (Figure 2). It would be a tall order for the private sector to 
adequately serve all the borrowers that require financing.
Times have changed since the introduction of Grad PLUS in 2006, and the higher education 
population of more than a decade ago simply does not reflect the current student body.26 And 
because employers are demanding a more diverse workforce with a higher level of formal education, 
16
Note: Percentage of graduate students at for-profit schools who borrowed private education loans in AY 2004-05 is 
authors’ calculation based on available data.
Source: National Postsecondary Student Aid Study (NPSAS) 2004, 2008, 2012 and 2016.
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private student loan lenders would need to serve most, if not all, of the students who currently rely 
on federal loans to maintain the current level of access to graduate education. However, advocates 
of private lending have not explained how the private sector would be able to generate the capital 
to support the private student loan risk attached to such an access-driven pool of borrowers. The 
answer is that this capital would be unavailable and would cause irreparable disruption to advanced 
education and the American workforce. 
Another reason why private lending in the pre- and post-Grad PLUS eras is different is because 
the cost of education has risen at the same time that credit has gotten tighter. In the first report in 
this series, we demonstrated that tuition increases have not been the result of the availability of 
Grad PLUS loan dollars.27 Rather, rises in tuition are the result of textbook economic factors like the 
increase in demand for college education and increases in the costs of delivering a higher education 
driven by labor and other expenses.
Thus, in terms of raw dollars, graduate school is simply more expensive today than it was in 2005-
06 (Table 2). This means that more money must be lent to borrowers now, either by the federal 
government or by private lenders, to finance graduate education. While this makes little difference 
regarding loan approval in federal lending programs, private student loan lenders could certainly 
use requested loan amounts to deny an applicant even though institutional costs are outside 
applicants’ control.
Prior to the Great Recession, credit across all sectors was much more readily available than it is now. 
In the immediate aftermath of the financial crisis in 2008, lenders enforced much more demanding 
17
Some may argue that prior to 
Grad PLUS, there actually were 
more private loans than data 
shows because private lenders 
participated in the Federal Family 
Education Loan (FFEL) program. 
They argue that even though 
the loans were federally-backed, 
they were made and serviced by 
private lenders, and thus private 
student loans likely accounted 
for a significant percentage of 
education loan disbursements.
Although private lenders played 
a central role in FFEL loans, the 
program’s terms made those 
loans materially different from 
a standard private student 
loan. Because there was both 
an interest rate subsidy and 
a guarantee against default 
from the federal government 
that substantially reduced the 
credit risk to a private lender for 
nonperforming loans, FFEL loans 
did not exhibit the type of market-
based signals and discipline that 
policymakers and advocates seek 
from a private sector takeover. 
Thus, it is not appropriate to 
look to the FFEL loan program 
as indicative of private lender 
behavior, then or now.28
lending standards and restricted the flow of credit 
dramatically.29 This lasted for several years and 
only recently has credit begun to loosen again.30 
However, investors and lenders in some industries, 
leery of repeating the mistakes of the past, still have 
not returned to pre-Great Recession levels and may 
never do so.31
These same trends were mirrored in the private 
student loan space. According to the Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), from 2005 to 
2007, underwriting standards loosened, and “during 
this period, lenders were more likely to originate 
loans to borrowers with lower credit scores than 
they had previously been.”32 But after 2008, private 
lenders enacted stricter lending policies requiring 
more cosigners and “increased overall credit scores 
within their portfolios by tightening credit standards 
and reducing lending to nonprime borrowers.”33
The combined factors of private lenders never 
having a commanding share of the student loan 
market, increased cost of attendance and reduced 
availability of credit make present-day lending a 
unique time in higher education financing, for which 
there is little precedent. Thus, it is erroneous to claim 
that we can “go back” to a utopian era of private 
student loan lending that arguably never existed.
INCENTIVE STRUCTURES 
(ACCESS VS. PROFIT)
Lawmakers must also consider that on a more 
fundamental level, the missions of the federal 
government and private student lenders could not be 
further apart. The purpose of the HEA is to expand 
access to higher education to all students in America. 
The various student aid programs that exist were 
designed with the goal of ensuring that a student 
who wants to advance his or her education can do 
so without regard to background or circumstance. 
Equity and access are at the heart of HEA lending 
programs.
The goal of private student lenders is to make money 
or, in the case of state-based and non-profit lenders, 
18
PUBLIC 
IN-STATE
PUBLIC 
OUT-OF-STATE
PRIVATE
NONPROFIT
2005–06 $7,780 $18,370 $21,530
2007–08 $8,520 $19,090 $21,770
2009–10 $9,620 $20,790 $22,700
2011–12 $10,280 $21,240 $23,000
2013–14 $10,760 $22,020 $24,140
2015–16 $11,100 $22,590 $25,160
Note: Prices are weighted by full-time equivalent graduate enrollment. Figures are in constant dollars.
Source: Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS), 2005-15.
to make enough money to sustain themselves and continue working toward their organizational 
missions. Leaders of for-profit companies have a legal fiduciary duty to their board, shareholders 
and other investors to operate in a manner designed to provide a return on investment; therefore, 
their lending policies will reflect that reality. Individual well-being, institutional diversity and other 
societal goals are of little or no concern to most private lenders except to the extent such ideals 
further the primary objective.
In contrast to the federal government, private lenders’ principal method of achieving their goal is to 
limit access to their capital. Doing so lessens the risk of loss and increases profitability. Similarly, as 
underwriting dictates, private lenders consider applicants’ backgrounds and circumstances because 
those measures tend to have predictive value as to whether borrowers will repay their student loans. 
These lending policies and effects are tailored toward private lenders’ core mission: to maximize the 
value of the company.
Some argue the private sector’s capital-limiting framework could bring market discipline to the 
federal loan portfolio.34 There is no doubt that the efficiency and effectiveness of the federal 
programs could be enhanced by adopting some private lending best practices. But the fundamental 
dichotomy would remain: HEA is designed to expand, not contract, access to advanced education.
To be clear, there is nothing wrong with making money. It is simply incongruent with the intended 
purpose of federal lending in HEA. Advocating for replacing federal loans to graduate borrowers 
with private loans does not reconcile the two entities’ distinct end goals, and, in fact, clearly 
illuminates the differences. Failure to recognize the differences means the resulting unintended 
consequences will be vast and severe.
 Table 2
AVERAGE TUITION AND FEES FOR FULL-TIME GRADUATE 
STUDENTS (AY 2005-06 TO 2015-16)
19
WILLINGNESS AND ABILITY TO REPAY
If policymakers are envisioning a significant role for private graduate lending, it is critical they 
understand how lenders make lending decisions. Depending on the underwriting criteria used, it 
becomes algorithmic to determine who receives a loan and who does not, the amount of the loan 
and the associated terms. Lawmakers should examine underwriting criteria and focus on who is 
unlikely to receive private loans to determine whether those results conflict with the HEA’s mission of 
expanding access to higher education.
Student loans differ from most other consumer loans because, by definition, they are unsecured—
that is, there is usually no readily available collateral (students typically lack substantial assets and 
lenders cannot repossess one’s education) and payments are not usually due until long after the loan 
is made. Because of this, private student loans are inherently riskier than auto loans or credit cards. 
As a result, underwriting criteria, typically focusing on one’s willingness and ability to repay, is likely 
to be more stringent, especially for larger graduate loans.
Willingness to repay underwriting is focused solely on how a borrower has handled repaying their 
financial obligations in the past. Although not exclusively, the primary tool to assess a borrower’s 
willingness to repay a debt is to review a borrower’s or cosigner’s credit report and score. Examining 
Lawmakers should examine underwriting criteria 
and focus on who is unlikely to receive private loans 
to determine whether those results conflict with 
the HEA’s mission of expanding access to higher 
education.
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borrowers’ past performance (e.g., on-time payments, credit balances, defaults, legal actions, 
etc.) is fairly predictive of future repayment habits on new debt, thus lenders use this method often 
because it is formulaic and efficient. This is the type of underwriting most consumers come to expect. 
However, because student loans are different than other typical consumer loans, especially in edge-
case lending decisions, lenders may require additional information to better judge loan eligibility.
In private student loan lending, there is additional value in determining a borrower’s ability to 
repay. This differs from willingness to repay in that it assesses additional evidence to determine if 
a borrower, even after having demonstrated positive repayment outcomes, will have the means to 
repay a student loan. This supplemental information tends to focus on institutional or programmatic 
outcomes (e.g., school reputation, graduation and job placement rates, etc.), the borrower’s 
academic credentials or activities, or anything else that can help a lender determine if a borrower’s 
future income will be enough to repay the student loan obligation on time and in full.
At its core, ability to repay is an assessment tool that tries to determine whether the combination 
of the borrower and the program will deliver a positive return on the educational investment. This 
is the market-based discipline that advocates of private student lending seek to introduce to the 
federal lending portfolio. While this may make some sense on its face, it should be noted that private 
lenders use this underwriting criterion, not because of charity or concern for the individual and the 
quality of the institution, but rather as an important mechanism to determine whether the borrower 
will repay the loan and the lender will make a profit. This, again, conflicts with the purpose of 
federal investment in higher education: expanding access.
Evidence suggests that most private student loan lenders use willingness to repay underwriting 
criteria to make lending decisions.35 In fact, some lenders have expressed concerns about utilizing 
ability to repay metrics for fear of potentially violating discrimination laws.36 Still, it is important for 
policymakers to understand that underwriting criteria can be whatever the lender chooses so long 
as it does not run afoul of federal or state laws or regulations. Understandably, a lender will use 
whatever underwriting standards the financial institution deems appropriate for the company to meet 
its profitability pool and fiscal objectives. This makes perfect business sense but runs counter to the 
goal of expanding access to advanced education.
21
4DENIED AGAIN!
THE EFFECT OF GRADUATE LENDING 
PRIVATIZATION
Lenders will not lend to anyone who they believe will not repay a loan. While some defaults are 
inevitable, lenders do complex analyses to ensure that their firms are profitable. Lenders will design 
their lending criteria in a way that maximizes the quality of the approved applicant pool to meet 
their fiscal goals. Applicants who do not meet the standard, regardless of future potential, will be 
denied a loan. It’s that simple.
Because most private student lenders use willingness to repay underwriting to make lending 
decisions, it is worth exploring who might be denied loans if federal graduate lending were to 
be capped or eliminated. While each individual lending determination would be based on each 
applicant’s unique situation, there is data that can tell us who might be most ripe for denial. Thus, we 
examine two main factors in the willingness to repay criteria: how much do borrowers owe and what 
are their repayment trends.
Black graduate students seeking to borrow and 
institutions serving large minority populations would 
likely be the most negatively impacted by the removal 
of federal lending from the graduate space.
Black graduate students seeking to borrow and institutions serving large minority populations would likely 
be the most negatively impacted by the removal of federal lending from the graduate space. Reviewing 
federal loan data shows that other populations would be negatively affected as well by student loan 
privatization; however, the evidence is clear that black students’ access to advanced education would be 
the most severely hampered.
BLACK BORROWERS ARE MOST RIPE FOR LENDING DENIALS
Black students would likely be the most harmed by privatization of graduate student loans because they 
typically carry the highest loan balances, and the limited data we have on repayment suggests they 
struggle to repay their loans more than any other racial subpopulation. Using data from the National 
Postsecondary Student Aid Study (NPSAS), we examined borrowing habits of graduate borrowers who 
completed their program in academic year 2015-16 and found that black graduates rely the most on 
federal student loans and tend to have the highest debt balances upon graduation.
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Borrowing Trends
Compared to peers of other races, black graduate students are the most likely to borrow and rely on 
federal student loans. In 2016, 80 percent of black graduates borrowed federal loans to fund their 
graduate education (Table 3). The difference is just as stark when examining by race and degree 
type—79 percent of black master’s graduates borrowed; 81 percent of black research doctoral 
graduates borrowed; and 90 percent of black professional degree graduates borrowed federal 
loans.
BORROWED DID NOT BORROW
All Degrees
White 57% 43%
Black 80% 20%
Hispanic/Latino 72% 28%
Asian 43% 57%
Total 60% 40%
Master’s
White 54% 46%
Black 79% 21%
Hispanic/Latino 71% 29%
Asian 39% 61%
Total 58% 42%
Research Doctoral
White 54% 46%
Black 81% 19%
Hispanic/Latino 71% 29%
Asian 21% 79%
Total 57% 43%
Professional
White 75% 25%
Black 90% 10%
Hispanic/Latino 76% 24%
Asian 64% 36%
Total 75% 25%
 Table 3
Source: NPSAS 2016, PowerStats.
PERCENT OF GRADUATES WHO BORROWED FEDERAL 
LOANS FOR GRADUATE EDUCATION BY RACE AND DEGREE 
(AY 2015-16)
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The reliance on federal loans has increased over time for black and Hispanic/Latino graduates. 
From 2000 to 2016, the percentage of black and Hispanic/Latino graduates who borrowed federal 
loans for graduate education grew considerably—black and Hispanic/Latino graduates increased 
their reliance on federal loans by 12 and 23 percentage points, respectively (Figure 4). Even with 
the significant jump in reliance on federal loans by Hispanic/Latino borrowers, black borrowers 
still top them by 8 percentage points. Overall, black graduates borrowed an average cumulative 
federal debt 17 percent higher than their white peers ($70,207 for black graduates and $59,997 for 
white graduates), and their median debt was 33 percent higher ($51,250 for black graduates and 
$38,473 for white graduates) (Table 4).
Black master’s graduates had borrowed, at the median, $15,000 more than white graduates and 
on average graduated with $10,000 more in federal student loan debt. Similarly, black research 
doctoral graduates borrowed on average over $30,000 more than their white peers, and black 
median debt is nearly double that of white graduates ($113,054 for black graduates and $59,682 
for white graduates) (Table 4).
The disparity between races in federal student loan debt taken for a professional degree is even 
more pronounced. Black graduates who borrowed left school with a median debt level of over 
$70,000 more in loans than their white peers ($207,205 for black graduates and $130,741 for white 
graduates). On average, blacks had nearly $60,000 more in debt ($198,982 for black graduates 
Source: National Postsecondary Student Aid Study (NPSAS) 2000 to 2016, TrendStats.
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BORROWERS’ CUMULATIVE FEDERAL LOAN DEBT FOR 
GRADUATE EDUCATION BY RACE AND DEGREE (AY 2015-16)
and $140,603 for white graduates) (Table 4). Even accounting for higher debt due to higher tuition 
in professional school, these disparities are striking.
The stark difference between black and white graduates’ debt levels is also apparent when 
examining cumulative federal loan debt by degree program. For example, black Master of Business 
Administration (MBA) graduates borrowed nearly $19,000 more on average than their white peers. 
For a Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.) degree, blacks borrowed on average $37,000 more than their 
AVERAGE MEDIAN
All Degrees
White $59,997 $38,473
Black $70,207 $51,250
Hispanic/Latino $57,127 $41,000
Asian $86,521 $56,868
Total $63,025 $41,000
Master’s
White $40,217 $31,282
Black $50,594 $46,632
Hispanic/Latino $41,978 $37,532
Asian $58,992 $48,280
Total $43,304 $36,352
Research Doctoral
White $73,131 $59,682
Black $107,272 $113,054
Hispanic/Latino $96,838 $65,897
Asian ‡ ‡
Total $82,654 $68,732
Professional
White $140,603 $130,741
Black $198,982 $207,205
Hispanic/Latino $144,921 $167,408
Asian $151,647 $123,707
Total $148,722 $138,516
 Table 4
Note: ‡ symbol indicates that available data could not provide a reliable estimate.
Source: NPSAS 2016, PowerStats.
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white peers, and for a Juris Doctor degree (J.D.), a staggering $98,000 more on average than their 
white peers (Table 5).
Compared to peers of other races, black graduates generally borrowed the most, on average and 
at the median, for master’s degrees at public and for-profit institutions. This holds true for research 
doctoral degrees and professional degrees across all institutional sectors.37
Across institutional sectors, degree types and most degree programs, black graduates, compared 
to graduates of all other races, represent the highest percentage of those who borrowed above the 
BORROWERS’ CUMULATIVE FEDERAL LOAN DEBT FOR 
GRADUATE EDUCATION BY RACE AND PROGRAM 
(AY 2015-16)
AVERAGE MEDIAN
Master of Business Administration (MBA)
White $36,598 $30,750
Black $55,317 $44,574
Hispanic/Latino $34,482 $31,020
Asian ‡ ‡
Total $44,141 $36,779
Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.)
White $77,925 $64,500
Black $115,028 $123,972
Hispanic/Latino $92,588 $74,745
Asian ‡ ‡
Total $85,507 $75,389
Law (J.D.)
White $100,510 $94,464
Black $198,760 $206,700
Hispanic/Latino $149,573 $167,408
Asian ‡ ‡
Total $120,406 $111,914
 Table 5
Note: ‡ symbol indicates that available data could not provide a reliable estimate.
Source: NPSAS 2016, PowerStats.
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PERCENT OF GRADUATES WHO HAD ABOVE AVERAGE 
DEBT (AY 2015-16)
WHITE BLACK HISPANIC/LATINO ASIAN
Institution Sector
Public 11% 23% 11% 18%
Private Nonprofit 21% 28% 25% 27%
Private For-profit 26% 33% 20% 12%
Degree Type
Master’s 9% 19% 12% 13%
Research Doctoral 25% 63% 56% 9%
Professional 57% 74% 56% 52%
Degree Program
M.S. 7% 18% 9% ‡
M.A. 8% 17% 23% ‡
M.Ed. 4% 30% 9% ‡
MBA 6% 19% 5% 24%
Ph.D. 25% 71% 29% 16%
Ed.D. 21% 68% ‡ ‡
J.D. 53% 88% 47% ‡
 Table 6
Note: The average cumulative federal loan debt for those who borrowed is approximately $63,000. Debt is cumulative 
federal loan debt for graduate education. ‡ symbol indicates that available data could not provide a reliable estimate.
Source: NPSAS 2016, PowerStats.
average federal debt level.38 For example, 71 percent of black Ph.D. graduates borrowed more than 
$63,000 in federal student loans for graduate education, compared with only 25 percent of white 
graduates (Table 6).
In the first paper in this series, we defined graduate borrowers with over $100,000 in cumulative 
federal loan debt for graduate education as “high-debt borrowers.”39 When examining debt by both 
degree type and program, black borrowers generally represent the highest percentages of high-debt 
borrowers, when comparing by race. Stunningly, for research doctoral degrees, 51 percent of black 
graduates were high-debt borrowers compared to just 15 percent of white graduates. An even more 
striking disparity exists when comparing high-debt borrowing for law degrees (83 percent of black 
graduates were high-debt borrowers compared to 31 percent of white graduates) (Table 7).
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Moreover, these borrowing trends at the graduate level match those at the undergraduate level, 
where black undergraduates borrow more, and more often, to finance a bachelor’s degree than their 
white peers—even at public institutions where tuition prices are the lowest.40 This compounds the debt 
burden for black graduates who then borrow more to attend graduate school.
This point is illustrated by research examining the total debt of black graduates, both undergraduate 
and graduate, which noted that “[b]lack students were 130 percent more likely to have six-figure 
debt burdens than white students.”41 In fact, for the 2015-16 academic year, an estimated “150,000 
black borrowers had $100,000 in debt, more than half of the number of white borrowers with the 
same debt level (250,000), despite white graduate student enrollment being four times [that of] black 
grad student enrollment.”42 It is clear that black graduates would likely be requesting large loan 
amounts from private lenders, which may decrease the likelihood of approval.
PERCENT OF GRADUATES WHO HAD “HIGH-DEBT” 
(AY 2015-16)
WHITE BLACK HISPANIC/LATINO ASIAN
Institution Sector
Public 7% 8% 4% 9%
Private Nonprofit 12% 15% 15% 21%
Private For-profit 14% 19% 8% 10%
Degree Type
Master’s 3% 6% 4% 6%
Research Doctoral 15% 51% 25% 2%
Professional 47% 59% 54% 42%
Degree Program
M.S. 2% 1% 4% ‡
M.A. 4% 6% ‡ ‡
M.Ed. 1% ‡ ‡ ‡
MBA 1% 10% ‡ ‡
Ph.D. 13% 56% 18% ‡
Ed.D. 15% 49% ‡ ‡
J.D. 31% 83% 46% ‡
 Table 7
Note: We define “high-debt” as having over $100,000 in cumulative federal loan debt for graduate education. ‡ 
symbol indicates that available data could not provide a reliable estimate.
Source: NPSAS 2016, PowerStats.
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Repayment Trends
Rates of repayment for graduate students generally appear high while default rates are as low as 
5 percent.43 Even analysts who are wary of high levels of graduate borrowing acknowledge that 
graduate students’ rates of default are low.44 However, to discern repayment and default rates 
for students from all subpopulations, more publicly available disaggregated data on graduate 
borrowers’ outcomes is needed.
Yet, there is likely cause for concern about repayment among black graduate borrowers. Research 
at the undergraduate level shows that there are significant repayment disparities by race. Regarding 
progress on debt in repayment for example, black college graduates, at the median, owed more 
than their original principal loan balance 12 years after entering college—whereas white college 
graduates at the median had repaid more than half of their original balance owed at that point in 
time.45
As for student loan default rates, black bachelor’s degree recipients were nearly four times more 
likely to be in default than their white peers.46 Of black borrowers in repayment on their student 
loans in 2014, 19 percent were in default and another 33 percent were seriously delinquent on their 
payments (90 days or more past due).47 In fact, black bachelor’s degree recipients are more likely to 
default than their white peers who did not even complete their undergraduate studies, which suggests 
that completion alone does not accurately predict one’s ability to repay a student loan.48
When examining these repayment trends, it is important to note that these repayment outcomes could 
be caused by a host of factors, many of which would be beyond black borrowers’ individual control. 
Some scholars have highlighted underlying factors like familial resources (e.g., the wealth gap 
between races) and labor market outcome disparities to provide proper context for poor repayment 
rates among black borrowers.49 But private lenders make lending decisions based mostly on data 
and would not take into account the reasons undergirding the data. If the undergraduate repayment 
trend data is consistent at the graduate level, using an ability to repay underwriting criteria may 
preclude large numbers of black graduate students from accessing the necessary capital to advance 
their education and careers.
It is already clear that using traditional underwriting standards would disproportionally harm low-
income and minority borrowers.50 This borrowing and repayment data, if used in either willingness 
or ability to repay criteria, portends significant potential roadblocks for black graduate students 
in obtaining private student loans for their graduate education. These combined factors make it 
extremely likely that blacks will be disproportionally harmed by a move to private lending in the 
graduate space.
Historically Black Colleges and Universities May Suffer
It is worth noting that while lending is done on an individual basis, many schools may also suffer 
under a shift to private lending, either because not enough of the students they serve would be 
approved or because lenders can opt not to lend to anyone attending the institution. Recall, ability to 
repay underwriting essentially judges institutional quality, and a lender has neither an obligation nor 
an interest in lending money that it believes it will not recoup.
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As noted above, there is little information about graduate repayment. However, recent analysis of 
limited repayment data indicates that Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCU) would 
likely be harmed by applying an ability to repay standard to their student borrowers. Of the top 
20 graduate and professional schools with the highest share of borrowers who had not reduced 
principal loan amounts five years after entering repayment, 12 (60 percent) of them were HBCUs.51 
While the median share of borrowers measured by the same metric at all graduate and professional 
schools was 20 percent, HBCUs ranged as high as 65 percent of their borrowers down to 44 percent 
of their borrowers having not paid down principal.52 Even the lowest HBCU on the list was still 24 
percent higher than the national average.
Although the study was not comprehensive, the repayment rates of those HBCU graduate programs 
strongly suggest the ability to repay criteria would not be satisfied by many students attending those 
institutions. Even the applicants who had the best willingness to repay track record and outstanding 
academic performance would likely be denied if they attended certain institutions because lenders 
would not be willing to bear the risk of large-scale defaults. One could envision entire categories of 
schools, or at least institutions that serve large minority populations, closing because of insufficient 
funding.
Lending Discrimination
Some may argue that widespread disenfranchisement of black borrowers is unlikely to occur because 
there are state and federal discrimination laws barring such a practice. While those laws may stop 
individual bad actors, they are unlikely to prevent an unintentional cumulative effect of dramatically 
reducing the number of black graduate students who are able to obtain financing for their education.
Specifically, at the federal level, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) prohibits any lender from 
engaging in intentional discrimination against enumerated protected classes (e.g., race, religion, sex, 
age, etc.).53 And while not statutorily defined, federal regulators have indicated that lending policies 
that may have a “disparate impact” on protected classes could violate ECOA.54
Disparate impact could be considered lending discrimination if “a lender applies a practice uniformly 
to all applicants but the practice has a discriminatory effect on a prohibited basis and is not justified 
by business necessity.”55 Lenders could, using entirely legitimate and sound underwriting criteria, 
unintentionally create an environment where raising capital and other market pressures would dictate 
that a whole class of people be effectively shut out of pursuing advanced education.56 
We are not suggesting that individual private student lenders would engage in intentional or 
disparate impact discrimination. Just the opposite: lawsuits are costly and anathema to the profit-
driven mission of private lenders. But “business necessity” would dictate that borrowers who do not 
meet institutions’ underwriting criteria would be denied.
If large loan balances and poor repayment rates are to be counted as negatives in student loan 
underwriting criteria, then many black borrowers would be denied. Even in a regulatory framework 
where disparate impact is outlawed, it could be the case that no individual private lender may 
be found liable of discrimination, but the cumulative effect of denials across all lenders effectively 
permits disparate impact nevertheless.
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Lenders could, using entirely legitimate and sound 
underwriting criteria, unintentionally create an 
environment where market pressures and capital 
would dictate a whole class of people to be 
effectively shut out from advanced education. 
Lenders could, using entirely legitimate and sound 
underwriting criteria, unintentionally create an 
environment where raising capital and other market 
pressures would dictate that a whole class of people be 
effectively shut out of pursuing advanced education.
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5CONCLUSION
Federal graduate lending provides a critical financing option for all students, regardless of 
background or station, who are interested in obtaining an advanced degree. Given that the 
fundamental purpose of the Higher Education Act is to expand access to higher education, 
the current federal lending programs are clearly aligned with that mission and have helped 
to achieve HEA’s goals.
In this report, we have discussed how graduate borrowers are unnecessarily targeted for 
programmatic cuts given their high performance as a cohort in the federal loan portfolio; 
how there will be no return to a golden era of private student loans; how lending decisions 
are made; and as a result of those lending decisions, how black graduate borrowers will 
likely be the most negatively impacted by privatization of federal student loans.
Some critics will argue that the negative impacts (denied borrowers and potentially closing 
institutions) is a good thing. Advocates say that we should not saddle borrowers with 
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debt they cannot afford to attend schools with poor outcomes. That is a perfectly sensible policy 
objective. However, the policy solution offered, to retreat entirely from graduate federal lending, is a 
blunt instrument that unnecessarily targets students.
The federal government has far more appropriate and effective options and tools (e.g., school 
accountability regimes, accreditation reform, etc.) at their disposal that could inject institutional 
quality controls into higher education. If the goals are to improve institutional and programmatic 
outcomes and potentially lower cost, then policy proposals should be squarely focused on those 
goals. Lawmakers should not be enticed by wholesale student loan privatization as an end-run to 
student or institutional accountability metrics. Given that HEA reauthorizations are infrequent at best, 
America cannot afford to lose an entire generation of students as the result of policy changes that do 
not address the stated problem.
Changes to federal graduate lending must not come at the expense of students, especially not 
our most critically underserved. Making it more difficult for students to secure financing for their 
advanced degrees, thereby reducing access and weakening America’s workforce, would take us 
in the wrong direction. Congress must ensure that policy proposals are always grounded in the 
fundamental purpose of HEA: expanding access.
Keinan Thompson   Raymond AlQaisi
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